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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
CAROLYN CRUMP n/k/a * 
CAROLYN FORSGREN, BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ON 
* WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. Case No. 92-0023 
* 
ROBERT CRUMP, Priority No. 4 
Defendant/Respondent. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This court granted Petitioners Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
on or about June 22, 1992. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue before this court is whether or not the State of 
Utah has the jurisdiction to modify a child custody award in the 
Montana Court. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The statutory provisions pertinent to deciding the issue 
before this court is the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act (UCCJA) Section 78-45C-1, et. seq. Utah Code Annotated and the 
Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) 28 U.S.C. Section 
1738 A (1989) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 7, 1983, a divorce was granted to the parties 
herein by the Montana District Court. The issue of custody was 
reserved by the court and decided at a later date on June 6, 1985. 
The Montana Court awarded joint custody of the children to the 
parties, with the children to reside with CAROLYN CRUMP, the 
petitioner herein, during the school year; and the children were 
to reside with ROBERT CRUMP, the respondent herein, during the 
summer months. After the divorce hearing and prior to the custody 
hearing, CAROLYN CRUMP and the children moved to the State of Utah. 
ROBERT CRUMP remained in the State of Montana and exercised his 
joint custody with the children during the summer months. 
ROBERT CRUMP filed an authenticated copy of the Montana Decree 
of Divorce in the First Judicial District, County of Cache, State 
of Utah in February of 1989, and filed a Petition to Modify the 
Montana Decree at the same time. A hearing was held on the 
Petition on April 24, 1990. ROBERT CRUMP appealed the decision 
rendered in that hearing on July 13, 1990. The appeal was 
dismissed by the Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction on 
November 22, 1991. CAROLYN CRUMPTs Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari was granted by the Utah Supreme Court on the 22nd of 
June, 1992. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Both the UCCJA and the PKPA require that jurisdiction over 
child custody matters remain in the state which originally entered 
the custody order so long as one of the parties or a child have 
remained a resident of that state. Robert Crump did not and could 
not consent to jurisdiction in the state of Utah. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties to this action were divorced by a Decree 
entered by the Montana District Court on December 7, 1983- The 
Court reserved the issue of custody for a later hearing. After the 
Divorce and prior to the Hearing on Custody, CAROLYN CRUMP, the 
Petitioner herein, moved from the State of Montana to the State of 
Utah. (R. Vol.2, P.10-12) 
2. On June 6, 1985, a Custody Hearing was held by the 
Montana Court. Prior to that Hearing, CAROLYN CRUMP told the 
children that they would be moving back to the State of Montana. 
(R. 10, Partial Transcript of Hearing before Judge Robert M. 
Holter, attached hereto). The Montana Court placed the children 
in the joint custody of both parties and provided that the primary 
residence during the school year would be with the mother, and that 
the primary place of residence during the summer vacation would be 
with the father. The Court also concluded that it was in the best 
interests of the children that liberal and substantial visitation 
be granted back and forth between the parties. (R. 12). 
3. ROBERT CRUMP, the Respondent herein, filed an 
authenticated copy of the Montana Decree of Divorce in the First 
Judicial District, County of Cache, State of Utah, in February of 
1989, and filed a Petition to Modify the Montana Decree at the same 
time. Judge Gordon J. Low denied the Petition of ROBERT CRUMP to 
modify the child custody but did alter the visitation and modify 
the child support provisions of the Montana Decree. 
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4. ROBERT CRUMP at all times remained in the State of 
Montana and exercised his joint custody of the children in the 
State of Montana by having the children with him during the summer 
visitation periods as provided by the Montana Decree. 
5. ROBERT CRUMP appealed the Decision of Judge Low to the 
Utah Court of Appeals, which entered an Opinion on November 22, 
1991, holding that the Utah Court did not have jurisdiction to 
modify the Montana Decree. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MONTANA STATE COURT HAS THE SOLE JURISDICTION TO RULE 
ON THE ISSUE OF MODIFICATION OF THE ORIGINAL DIVORCE DECREE. 
The decision of whether Montana or the State of Utah has the 
jurisdiction to modify the Divorce Decree must be based upon the 
provisions of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) and the 
Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). All three 
judges of the Court of Appeals acknowledge that the PKPA preempts 
State Law and the UCCJA when the provisions are in conflict. The 
PKPA appears to be very explicit about the issue of jurisdiction. 
Section 1738 A (d) states, as follows: 
The jurisdiction of a court of a state which has made a 
child custody determination consistently with the 
provisions of this section continues as long as the 
requirement of Subsection (c) (1) of this section 
continues to be met and such state remains the resident 
of the child or of any contestant. 
Section (c)(1) states: 
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A child custody determination made by a court of a State 
is consistent with the provisions of this section only 
if - (1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of 
such state: . . . 
This section clearly states that the jurisdiction of a 
state continues if that state had jurisdiction originally over the 
issue and either the child or any contestant remains a resident of 
that state. There is no dispute before this Court as to those 
issues. Clearly, the State of Montana had jurisdiction originally 
to enter a Divorce Decree and ROBERT CRUMP has remained a resident 
of that state from the time of the Divorce Decree to the present 
time. 
Since Montana does have jurisdiction over the custody issue 
involving the parties1 children, the question then becomes one of 
whether or not Utah has concurrent jurisdiction over that issue. 
Section (f) addresses that issue. That section states: 
A court of a state may modify a determination of the 
custody of the same child made by the court of another 
state if - (1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child 
custody determination; and (2) the court of the other 
state no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined to 
exercise such jurisdiction to modify such determination. 
The dispute about whether or not Utah has concurrent jurisdiction 
with Montana seems to center around the interpretation of Section 
(f)(1). It is the position of ROBERT CRUMP, that this section 
pertains to whether or not the State Court has jurisdiction over 
child custody matters. If a State Court did not have jurisdiction 
to decide child custody matters, such as a circuit court, its 
decision would not be valid. If the State Court has jurisdiction 
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over child custody matters then the provisions of subparagraph (2) 
must exist before the court is given any jurisdiction to modify 
the decree of another state. 
It is clear in the case before this Court that Montana still 
has jurisdiction and to this point has not declined to exercise 
that jurisdiction and Utah does not have any jurisdiction to modify 
the Montana Decree. It is not a question of whether Utah exercises 
its jurisdiction, but a question of whether or not Utah has any 
jurisdiction. The only way a different result could be obtained 
would be for the Court to interpret Section (f)(1) as creating dual 
jurisdiction. It is,the position of ROBERT CRUMP that there is no 
persuasive argument made by the Appellant or by the Dissenting 
Opinion to support this position. 
Section 78-45C-14 of the Utah Code Ann., part of the UCCJA 
Act, is consistent with the provisions of the PKPA. That section 
states: 
(1) if a court of another state has made a custody 
decree, a court of this state shall not modify that 
decree unless (a) it appears to the court of this state 
that the court which rendered the decree does not now 
have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites 
substantially in accordance with this act or has declined 
to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the 
court of this state has jurisdiction. [Emphasis added.] 
The Utah Act clearly requires that Montana no longer have 
jurisdiction or that it has declined to assume the jurisdiction to 
modify the Decree. If that is the case and if Utah qualifies as 
a state having jurisdiction but for the requirements of 
subparagraph a). then Utah may exercise its jurisdiction. The 
minority opinion cites subparagraph^ b) as recognizing dual 
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jurisdiction and argues that, therefore, it is a question of 
exercising jurisdiction. ROBERT CRUMP disagrees with that 
position. If the State of Montana no longer had jurisdiction 
because all parties had moved from the state and/or declined to 
exercise this jurisdiction, an[1162saa±tix2>2x3 not be brought in Utah 
unless Utah met one of the conditions for jurisdiction as set out 
in Section 78-45(c)(3) of Utah Code Ann. If Utah did not meet any 
of those conditions then it would not have jurisdiction over the 
case under any circumstances. It is ROBERT CRUMPfs contention that 
the purpose of subparagraph(b) is to prevent a state from 
attempting to modify a decree if it does not meet any of the other 
jurisdictional requirements and if the original state no longer 
has jurisdiction or has declined to exercise that jurisdiction. 
Such an interpretation would serve the purposes of the UCCJA 
and the PKPA by preventing a state from intervening where all the 
parties had moved from the original state and none of the other 
jurisdictional requirements of the Acts were met. 
The fact situation involved in this case is precisely the same 
as the illustration given by Professor Bodenheimer, who is the 
reporter for the special committee which drafted the Uniform Act, 
commenting about the provisions now contained in Section 78-45C-
14 of the Utah Code Ann. Bodenheimer in The Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught In the 
Conflict of Laws, 22 Vand.L.Rev. 1207, 1237 (1969) stated: 
A typical example is the case of the couple who are 
divorced in state A, their matrimonial home state, and 
whose children are awarded to the wife, subject to 
visitation rights of the husband. Wife and children move 
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to state B, with or without permission of the court to 
remove the children. State A has continuing jurisdiction 
and the courts in state B may not hear the wife's 
petition to make her the sole custodian, eliminate 
visitation rights, or make any other modification of the 
decree, even though state B has in the meantime become 
the 'home state' under section 3. The Jurisdiction of 
state A continues and is exclusive as long as the husband 
lives in state A unless he loses contact with the 
children, for example, by not using his visitation 
privileges for three years. 
Professor Bodenheimer's comments were cited by the Utah Court of 
Appeals in the case of State in the Interest of D.S.K., 792 P.2d 
118 (Utah App. 1990), at p. 124. 
Such an interpretation of the UCCJA and the PKPA clearly 
supports a number of the purposes stated in Section 78-45(c)-l of 
the UCCJA. A party should not be able to avoid the decision of a 
state court by merely moving to another state and remaining there 
for six (6) months, or by taking the children to another state and 
establishing significant contacts with that state. If parties were 
allowed to establish jurisdiction in another state solely on 
that basis then they would be encouraged to leave the originating 
state any time they were dissatisfied with its decisions or were 
fearful that the state at a later date would rule against them. 
Consequently, the interpretaton placed on these Acts by the 
majority of the Court of Appeals avoids jurisdictional competition 
and conflict, discourages continual controversies, deters abduction 
and other unilateral removals of children, avoids relitigation of 
custody decisions and facilitates the enforcement of custody 
decrees. The interpretation of the Acts adopted by the Dissenting 
Opinion, conversely, would encourage a party who was dissatisfied 
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with the state court's decision or who anticipated an unfavorable 
ruling in the future to immediately move to another state for a 
period of six (6) months so as to establish jurisdiction in that 
state. Such an interpretation would not be in the best interests 
of parents and children who are involved in divorces or custody 
disputes. 
POINT II 
THE RESPONDENT, ROBERT CRUMP, DID NOT VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT 
HIMSELF TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT.0 C 
CAROLYN CRUMP, in her Brief, states that jurisdiction should 
be exercised by this Court because ROBERT CRUMP filed a Petition 
in the State of Utah and that jurisdiction has been stipulated or 
conceded by this action. It was not the intent of ROBERT CRUMP to 
agree to jurisdiction in the State of Utah. ROBERT CRUMP felt that 
under the existing law he had to bring the action in the home state 
of the minor children. ROBERT CRUMP and his counsel were incorrect 
in so interpreting the law. However, there is no information before 
the Court that would indicate that ROBERT CRUMP voluntarily submitted 
to or stipulated to the jurisdiction of this state. In addition, it 
is a well-established principle of law that parties may not stipulate 
to the jurisdiction of the court. Either the court has that 
jurisdiction by law or it has not. Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc. 694 
P. 2d 1043 (Utah 1984) and State Department of Social Services y^ 
Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982). 
ROBERT CRUMP filed an authenticated copy of the Montana Decree 
of Divorce with the First Judicial District Court <>f Cache County, 
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in approximately February of 1989. At the same time he filed a 
Petition to Modify the Montana Decree concerning custody of the minor 
children. The first day of the Hearing on the Petition was April 
24, 1990. On April 25, 1990, the Court of Appeals entered its 
decision in the case of State in the Interest of D.S.K, supra. That 
case was not known to any of the parties or to the trial judge at the 
time the Petition was being heard. Had that Opinion been issued 
prior to ROBERT CRUMP filing his Petition, he would not have filed 
in the State of Utah, but would have petitioned the court in Montana. 
The failure of ROBERT CRUMP and/or his attorney to understand the law 
or to correctly interpret the law in question should not be viewed 
as voluntarily consenting to the jurisdiction of the Utah Court. 
CAROLYN CRUMP contends filing of the Montana Decree in Utah 
Courts under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Section 78-22a-2, et. 
seq., Utah Code Ann., confers jurisdiction upon the Utah Courts. 
The filing of a foreign judgment in the Utah Courts allows the Utah 
Court to give the judgment full faith and credit as required by the 
Federal Constitution. Even if it could be argued that that Act does 
confer jurisdiction, the Act would have to be interpreted consistent 
with the UCCJA which more specifically addresses the issue of 
jurisdiction in custody matters and the PKPA which supersedes any 
state act as it pertains to jurisdiction over custody matters. If 
this Court interprets those Acts as urged by ROBERT CRUMP then 
nothing in the Utah Foreign Judgment Act would be sufficient to 
confer jurisdiction upon this Court. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
ROBERT CRUMP contends that the majority decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeals should be sustained and that this Court should rule 
that both the PKPA and the UCCJA require that jurisdiction over child 
custody matters remain in the state which originally entered the 
order so long as one of the parties and/or a child have remained 
residents of that state. 
ROBERT CRUMP contends that the overall purpose of the Acts in 
question would be furthered by such a decision, ROBERT CRUMP also 
contends that he did not voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of 
.the State of Utah and could not have created jurisdiction in th 
State of Utah even if he had voluntarily sought such jurisdiction 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ @ d aY o f October, 1992. 
e 
10BERT A. ECHARI 
Attorney for Respondent 
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11 
APP. 1. OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS filed 
November 22, 1991. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. N0V,2 2 1991 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
-00O00 — —• 
c^jfj^-
Carolyn Crump, nka Carolyn 
Forsgren, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Robert Crump, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
'x^ary T Noonan 
Cterk of the Court 
OPINION ^ a n ^ o u a °* APP e a t e 
(For P u b l i c a t i o n ) 
Case No. 900362-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 22, 1991) 
First District, Cache County 
The Honorable Gordon J. Low 
Attorneys: Robert A. Echard, Ogden, for Appellant 
Stephen W. Jewell and Jeffrey ffR!f Burbank, Logan, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Russon. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Robert Crump appeals the lower court's denial of his 
petition to modify a Montana court's award of joint custody to 
him and Carolyn Crump, of their four children. We dismiss the 
appeal. 
FACTS 
Mr. and Mrs. Crump were granted a decree of divorce on 
December 7, 1983, by a Montana district court. Prior to a 
hearing on the issue of child custody, Mrs. Crump moved with the 
parties' four children from Montana to Utah. In August 1985, the 
Montana district court awarded Mr. Crump and Mrs. Crump joint 
legal custody of the children, with primary physical custody 
awarded to Mrs. Crump. In February 1989, Mr. Crump filed a 
petition in Utah to modify the Montana custody decree. The 
petition alleged a material change of circumstances, and urged 
that Mr. Crump be awarded primary physical custody of the 
children. Mr. Crump resided in Montana at the time he filed his 
petition, and has been a resident of that state at all times 
relevant to the present case. On April 24 and May 4 of 1990, the 
trial court in Utah heard evidence and denied the petition to 
modify the prior custody decree. However, the court made a 
slight change in the visitation provisions and modified the child 
support provisions of that decree. 
Mr. Crump appeals the trial court's denial of his petition 
to modify the custody order. On appeal, Mr. Crump raises three 
issues, claiming: (1) the trial court committed error in applying 
the standard for reviewing a petition to modify a child custody 
award; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in not modifying 
the award; and (3) the trial court committed error in failing to 
admit certain evidence. 
JURISDICTION 
A threshold issue is whether or not' this court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal. If a court lacks jurisdiction 
"it has not power to entertain the suit." Curtis v. Curtis, 789 
P.2d 717, 726 (Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted). Not only can 
a court not entertain the suit, the parties cannot cure the 
jurisdictional defect by waiver or consent. Mrs. Crump's 
argument, and the dissent's assertion that because "Mr. Crump 
voluntarily and affirmatively engaged the Utah courts . . . he 
waived any question regarding authority of the Utah courts to 
decide the issue . . . and has thus waived any objection to the 
district court's authority to exercise its jurisdiction," is 
without merit. We have held that 
while defects in personal jurisdiction can be 
waived, subject matter jurisdiction goes to 
the very power of a court to entertain an 
action. A lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction cannot be stipulated around nor 
cured by a waiver. A lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction can be raised at any time and 
when subject matter jurisdiction does not 
exist, neither the parties nor the court can 
do anything to fill that void. 
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The issue of waiver 
has been addressed by this court, see id., by our supreme court, 
and by the federal courts of appeal. See, e.g., McDouqald v. 
Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1484-85 (11th Cir.), cert, denied by 
Jenson v. McDouqald. 479 U.S. 860, 107 S. Ct. 207 (1986) (No 
waiver of jurisdictional defect in modification of child custody 
case even where father had consented to jurisdiction of 
Washington court, which court did not have jurisdiction); A.J* 
Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., Inc., 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 
1991) ("[A]cquiescence of the parties is insufficient to confer 
jurisdiction on the court, and a lack of jurisdiction can be 
raised by the court or either party at any time.'1); see also 
Annotation, Child Custody: When Does State That Issued Previous 
Custody Determination Have Continuing Jurisdiction Under Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) Or Parental Kidnapping 
Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS S 1738A, 83 A.L.R.4th 742, 748 
(1991) [hereinafter Annotation] (citation omitted) ("[S]ubject 
matter jurisdiction under [the relevant child custody statutes] 
cannot be vested by agreement of the parties, even though all of 
the parties desire an adjudication on the merits, and such 
jurisdiction cannot be conferred on the court by a party's 
failure to interpose a timely objection to the court's assumption 
of jurisdiction."). Therefore, we must determine if, under the 
applicable statutes, the courts of this state have jurisdiction 
to modify the Montana child custody award, and not ignore this 
issue on the basis of waiver simply because Mr. Crump came to 
Utah to initiate the action. 
A. Jurisdiction under the PKPA 
Congress adopted the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act 
(PKPA), the jurisdictional provisions of which are codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1738A (1989), to create a national standard that the 
states could look to in interstate child custody disputes. See 
generally Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-611, § 7, (1980), 94 Stat. 3569. The PKPA was created in part 
to solve problems that the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
(UCCJA) had not successfully addressed. State in Interest of 
D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118, 128 (Utah App. 1990) (citations omitted). 
"Where the PKPA and the state's version of the UCCJA conflict, 
the PKPA preempts state law." Id. (citations omitted). Because 
the PKPA "directly address the issues before this court, creates 
a very manageable two-prong test for determining modification 
jurisdiction, and would govern in the event of conflict with the 
UCCJA or other state law," Curtis. 789 P.2d at 720, we focus our 
analysis on this federal statute. 
One problem that the UCCJA failed to address was a specific 
provision for continuing jurisdiction. Annotation, 83 A.L.R.4th 
at 748.2 Therefore, the potential existed for concurrent 
1. In the present case, the result is the same under the UCCJA 
and the PKPA, although the PKPA uses language more specific than 
the UCCJA in addressing jurisdiction in the modification context. 
2. "However, the provisions of § 14 of the UCCJA, along with the 
Commissioners' Notes to that section, have been interpreted to 
(continued...) 
jurisdiction between two states. Dickens, The Parental 
Kidnapping Act: Application and Interpretation, 2 3 J. Fam. L. 
419, 426-27 (1984-85) [hereinafter Dickens]. The PKPA eliminates 
"the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction by conferring 
exclusive modification jurisdiction upon the home state of the 
child (i.e., the state which rendered the initial decree).'1 Id. 
at 426 (citing The Effect of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention 
Act of 1980 on Child Snatching, 17 New Eng. L. Rev. 499, 511 
(Spring 1982)). 
Unlike the UCCJA, the PKPA "anchors exclusive continuing 
jurisdiction to modify a previous custody decree in the original 
home state as long as the child or one of the contestants remains 
in that state.'1 Annotation, 83 A.L.R.4th at 748 (emphasis 
added). See also Dickens, 23 J. Fam. L. at 426. "While under 
the UCCJA scheme some states profess to find modification 
jurisdiction so long as they can properly exercise initial 
custody jurisdiction, the PKPA prevents a second state from 
modifying an initial state's order except in carefully 
circumscribed situations." Meade v. Meade, 812 F.2d 1473, 1476 
(4th Cir. 1987). This is clear from section (f) of the PKPA 
which states that 
A court of a State may modify a 
determination of the custody of the same 
child made by a court of another State, if — 
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a 
child custody determination; and 
(2) the court of the other State no 
longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined 
to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such 
determination. 
28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1989) (emphasis added). 
This section explicitly limits when a state, which would 
otherwise have jurisdiction over a child custody dispute, must 
defer to the state which originally issued the custody order.3 
"The PKPA is a departure from the jurisdictional requirements of 
the UCCJA and this departure is critical to the efficacy of the 
2. ( ...continued) 
establish exclusive continuing jurisdiction of the state that 
made the initial custody determination." Annotation, 83 
A.L.R.4th at 748. 
3. Specifically the PKPA provides that states shall not modify 
custody orders of another state "except as provided in subsection 
(f) of this section," 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (1989). 
new Act because a state court may no longer modify existing 
decrees of other states pursuant to the various and flexible 
bases of jurisdiction provided in the UCCJA." Dickens, 23 J, 
Fam. L. at 426- Further, this court has held "the language [of 
the PKPA] clearly eliminates the possibility of concurrent 
jurisdiction by conferring exclusive jurisdiction upon the state 
which rendered the initial decree[.]" State in Interest of 
D.S.K., 792 P.2d at 129. See also Dickens, 23 J. Fam. L. at 426-
27 (PKPA precludes a state court to modify existing decrees of 
other states when state which issued decree maintains 
jurisdiction). 
In the present case, both prongs of the jurisdictional test 
must be addressed. While a state may "have jurisdiction to make 
such a child custody determination,] . . ."28 U.S.C. § 1738A 
(1989), it must decline to exercise that jurisdiction unless "the 
court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has 
declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such 
determination." Id.4 While Utah may have had jurisdiction to 
issue the original order in this case, e.g., meeting the 
requirements of subsection (1), Utah does not have jurisdiction 
to modify an order from Montana because Montana has continuing 
exclusive jurisdiction. 
B. Jurisdiction under the UCCJA 
The decision we have reached conforms with comparable 
provisions of the UCCJA. The UCCJA was created to "avoid 
jurisdiction competition and conflict with courts of other states 
in matters of child custody," Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-l (1987), 
"promote cooperation with the courts of other states," id. , 
4. See also Meade v. Meade, 812 F.2d 1473, 1476 (4th Cir. 1987) 
(Virginia trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over 
modification of custody case as Virginia had continuing and 
exclusive jurisdiction); McDoucrald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1481 
(11th Cir.), cert, denied by Jenson v. McDouqald, 479 U.S. 860, 
107 S. Ct. 207 (1986) (no question that under PKPA, Florida, the 
state which issued initial custody decree, and not Washington, 
where mother and child later resided, maintained and properly 
exercised jurisdiction to modify custody decree) ,• Appleqate v. 
Garrt, 460 So.2d 1293, 1294 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (Alabama court 
had no jurisdiction to modify Texas custody decree where under 
PKPA state issuing original decree retains exclusive 
jurisdiction); Tufares v. Wright, 98 N.M. 8, 644 P.2d 522, 524 
(1982) (PKPA precludea modification of Utah custody decree by New 
Mexico where first prong of test was met but second prong was not 
met) . 
litigate custody where the child and family 
have the closest connections and where 
significant evidence concerning the child is 
most readily available, discourage conflict 
over custody, deter abductions and unilateral 
removals of children, avoid relitigation of 
another state's custody rulings, and promote 
the exchange of information and mutual 
assistance between different states[,] 
State in Interest of D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118, 123 (Utah App. 1990) 
(citing Utah Code Ann, § 78-45C-1 (1987)), or put more 
succinctly, "to bring some semblance of order into the existing 
chaos," Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction 
and Continuing Jurisdiction under the UCCJA, 14 Fam. L.Q. 203, 
214 (1981) [hereinafter Bodenheimer] (quoting UCCJA, 
Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 114 (1979)). All fifty 
states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UCCJA. 
As to when a court in this state has jurisdiction over a 
particular child custody matter, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(l) 
(1987) provides: 
A court of this state which is competent 
to decide child custody matters has 
jurisdiction to make a child custody 
determination by initial or modification 
decree if the conditions as set forth in any 
of the following paragraphs are met: 
(a) This state (i) is the home state of 
the child at the commencement of the 
proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home 
state within six months before commencement 
of the proceeding and the child is absent 
from this state because of his removal or 
retention by a person claiming his custody or 
for other reasons, and a parent or person 
acting as parent continues to live in this 
state; 
(b) It is in the best interest of the 
child that a court of this state assume 
jurisdiction because (i) the child and his 
parents, or the child and at least one 
contestant, have a significant connection 
with this state, and (ii) there is available 
in this state substantial evidence concerning 
the child's present or future care, 
protection, training, and personal 
relationships; 
(c) The child is physically present in 
this state and (i) the child has been 
abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an 
emergency to protect the child because he has 
been subjected to or threatened with 
mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise 
neglected or dependent; or 
(d)(i) It appears that no other state 
would have jurisdiction under prerequisites 
substantially in accordance with Paragraphs 
(a), (b), or (c), or another has declined to 
exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this 
state is the more appropriate forum to 
determine the custody of the child, and (ii) 
it is in the best interest of the child that 
this court assume jurisdiction. 
In the present case, under subsection (a), Utah is the home 
state5 of the children. However, the analysis does not end at 
determining whether these jurisdictional requirements are met. 
Section 78-45c-14(l) (1987)6 sets forth under what circumstances 
a court in Utah may modify an out-of-state custody decree: 
(1) If a court of another state has made a 
custody decree, a court of this state shall 
not modify that decree unless (a) it appears 
to the court of this state that the court 
which rendered the decree does not now have 
jurisdiction under jurisdictional 
prerequisites substantially in accordance 
with this act or has declined to assume 
jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the 
court of this state has jurisdiction. 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-2 defines "home state11 as f,the state 
in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived 
with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at 
least six consecutive months . . . .ff 
6. While this court has decided jurisdictional disputes under 
the UCCJA without regard to section 14, see, e.g., Rawlinqs v. 
Weiner, 752 P.2d 1327 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 
(Utah 1988), we believe that such questions are more easily 
answered by focusing on this section. See, e.g., Rawlinqs, 752 
P.2d at 1330-31 (Bench, J., concurring). 
(Emphasis added).7 Under this section, both the requirements of 
subsections (1)(a) and (b) must be met before Utah can modify a 
decree from another state. Section 15 provides that the second 
state will enforce the decree of the initial state as long as the 
initial state retains custody jurisdiction. "When both states 
have adopted the UCCJA, the apparent effect of §§ 14 and 15 is to 
give continuing exclusive jurisdiction to the initial state as 
long as that state retains a 'significant connection' basis for 
jurisdiction. ff Meade v. Meade, 812 F.2d 1473, 1476-77 (4th Cir. 
1987). It makes no difference that Utah may have met the 
jurisdiction prerequisites of section 3; section 14 must also be 
satisfied in order for this state to modify the Montana award.8 
7. We note that subsection 14 contains language similar to that 
found in subsection (f) of the PKPA. While it was hoped that 
subsection 14 of the UCCJA would eliminate the erroneous 
assumption of concurrent jurisdiction, it proved to be an 
imperfect remedy. Meade v. Meade, 812 F.2d 1473, 1476 (4th Cir. 
1987); Bodenheimer, 14 Fam. L.Q. at 214. "While under the UCCJA 
scheme some states profess to find modification jurisdiction so 
long as they can properly exercise initial custody jurisdiction, 
the PKPA prevents a second state from modifying an initial 
state's order . . . ." Meade, 812 F.2d at 1476. 
8. To read section 3 of the UCCJA, which merely addresses under 
what circumstances a state may have jurisdiction, without the 
qualifying language of section 14, as the dissent would have us 
do, is to ignore the plain language of the Act. Scholars 
addressing this very issue have commented that prior to the 
UCCJA, "concurrent jurisdiction in several states to modify an 
existing custody judgment was a major cause of parental resort to 
kidnapping to gain a more favorable judgment in a new forum.,f 
Bodenheimer, 14 Fam. L.Q. at 213-14. Therefore, section 14 is 
the key provision to carry out the UCCJA's objective of 
preventing jurisdictional conflict. Ld. at 214. This is 
especially true, when as here, the question is not simply, does a 
particular state have jurisdiction to make a custody decree, but, 
does a particular state have jurisdiction to modify an existing 
custody decree of another state. 
While section 14 was overlooked by early cases under the 
UCCJA, see, e.g.. Wheeler v. District Court, 186 Colo. 218, 526 
P.2d 658 (1974), and Howard v. Gish, 36 Md. App. 446, 373 A.2d 
1280 (1977), the majority of states, including Utah, now 
recognize the exclusive jurisdiction of the state which issued 
the original decree. See, e.g., State in Interest of D.S.K., 792 
P.2d at 128; Curtis, 789 P.2d at 724-25; Rawlinqs v. Weinerf 752 
P.2d 1327, 1330-31 (Utah App.) (Bench, J., concurring), cert, 
denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). The dissent however, chooses 
(continued...) 
It is clear that in the case at bar, the requirement of 
subsection (l)(a) is not met. 
[T]he continuing jurisdiction of the prior 
court is exclusive. Other states do not have 
jurisdiction to modify the decree. They must 
respect and defer to the prior state's 
continuing jurisdiction. 
Exclusive continuing jurisdiction 
is not affected by the child's residence in 
another state for six months or more. 
Although the new state becomes the child's 
home state, significant connection 
jurisdiction continues in the state of the 
prior decree where the court record and other 
evidence exists and where one parent or 
another contestant continues to reside. Only 
when the child and all parties have moved 
away is deference to another state's 
continuing jurisdiction no longer reguired. 
Bodenheimer, 14 Fam. L.Q. at 214-15 (quoted in State in Interest 
of D.S.K., 792 P.2d at 124) (emphasis added). See also Rawlings 
v. Weiner, 752 P.2d 1327, 1330-31 (Utah App.) (Bench, J., 
concurring), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). ,fAs long 
as the decree state retains jurisdiction there is no concurrent 
jurisdiction to modify a decree under the UCCJA," State in 
Interest of D.S.K., 792 P.2d at 124 (citations omitted), and "as 
long as one parent continues to reside in the original state and 
maintains some contact with the child . . .[,]" id. at 125, 
jurisdiction remains in the decree state. 
Mrs. Crump's argument that jurisdiction automatically 
shifted to Utah, the new home state, when she and the children 
moved there, is without merit. Mr. Crump continues to reside in 
Montana, where the original custody decree was issued. Montana 
has not relinquished jurisdiction, nor have the parties sought to 
have Montana do so. Instead, Mr. Crump chose to petition the 
8. (•..continued) 
to ignore Utah case law, and relies instead upon cases from 
Indiana and Illinois to make the point that concurrent 
jurisdiction does exist. 
courts of Utah for a modification of custody. Therefore, under 
the UCCJA, Montana has continuing exclusive jurisdiction and has 
not declined to exercise its jurisdiction in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
While there is much confusion as to the applicability of the 
UCCJA and the PKPA in child custody modification proceedings, 
this is no excuse for counsel in these types of cases to totally 
ignore the law. In the present case, we have no choice but to 
dismiss the appeal because the courts of Utah do not have 
jurisdiction to modify the Montana decree. The dissent is 
disturbed that this result might require further proceedings. 
However, if the proper procedures had been followed at the 
outset, the dissent would have no basis for its complaint. 
Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify Montana's 
custody decree, we dismiss the appeal. 
RUSSON, Judge (dissenting): 
I dissent. In my opinion, the Utah District Court did 
have jurisdiction in this matter and, further, had a right to 
exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody 
9. The dissent correctly points out that had the !fstay-at-home 
parent, of his or her own volition, moved from Montana, Utah 
would then be able to exercise its jurisdiction." However, it 
does not follow that "had the stay-at-home parent, of his or her 
own volition, never asserted his or her custody rights in 
Montana, Utah would also be able to exercise its jurisdiction." 
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)1 and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention 
Act (PKPA)• 
The majority opinion fails to adhere to the plain and 
unambiguous language of the UCCJA and the PKPA, as well as to 
their spirit and purpose, in its erroneous determination that the 
Utah District Court did not have jurisdiction to decide the 
matter that was before it.2 
I. BACKGROUND 
Prior to the UCCJA, there was constant conflict between 
custody orders of states having concurrent jurisdiction. This 
usually occurred when one parent moved from the state which 
granted the divorce to a different state, and then filed an 
action in the second state for custody of the minor children. 
Where the children were present with that parent, either by 
visitation or by having been taken there, that state naturally 
had jurisdiction to deal with their custody. If the decree 
entered was contrary to the decree of the original forum state, 
then the parties (and the courts) were faced with the problem of 
conflicting orders. 
II. JURISDICTION UNDER THE UCCJA 
A. Section 3 of the UCCJA3 
To solve this problem, the UCCJA was proposed and has now 
been adopted in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. 
It specifically recognizes that two states may have simultaneous 
1. In Utah, the UCCJA is set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45c-l 
to -26 (1987 and Supp. 1991). At all times relevant to this 
case, the statutory language found in the 1987 version of the 
statute governs. For the sake of consistency and clarity, all 
sections of the UCCJA are cross-referenced to the corresponding 
sections as set forth therein. 
2. In order to properly understand the state and federal 
responses to conflicts between states having concurrent 
jurisdiction, one must be aware that the UCCJA was first proposed 
in August 1968, while Congress did not enact the PKPA until 
December 1980. Accordingly, these two documents will be 
addressed chronologically. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1987). 
concurrent jurisdiction, but directs how such jurisdiction shall 
be exercised: 
(1) A court of this state which is 
competent to decide child custody matters has 
jurisdiction to make a child custody 
determination by initial or modification 
decree if the conditions as set forth in any 
of the following paragraphs are met: 
(a) This state (i) is the 
home state of the child at the time 
of commencement of the proceeding, 
or (ii) had been the child's home 
state within six months before 
commencement of the proceeding and 
the child is absent from this state 
because of his removal or retention 
by a person claiming his custody or 
for other reasons, and a parent or 
person acting as parent continues 
to live in this state; 
(b) It is in the best 
interest of the child that a court 
of this state assume jurisdiction 
because (i) the child and his 
parents, or the child and at least 
one contestant, have a significant 
connection with this state, and 
(ii) there is available in this 
state substantial evidence 
concerning the child's present or 
future care, protection, training, 
and personal relationships; 
(c) The child is physically 
present in this state, and (i) the 
child has been abandoned or (ii) it 
is necessary in an emergency to 
protect the child because he has 
been subjected to or threatened 
with mistreatment or abuse or is 
otherwise neglected or dependent; 
or 
(d) (i) It appears that no 
other state would have jurisdiction 
under prerequisites substantially 
in accordance with Paragraphs (a), 
(b), or (c), or another state has 
declined to exercise jurisdiction 
on the ground that this state is 
the more appropriate forum to 
determine the custody of the child, 
and (ii) it is in the best interest 
of the child that this court assume 
jurisdiction,, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-3 (1987) (emphasis added). 
"Home state" is defined by the UCCJA to mean: 
the state in which the child immediately 
preceding the time involved lived with his 
parents, a parent, or a person acting as 
parent, for at least six consecutive months, 
and in the case of a child less than six 
months old the state in which the child lived 
from birth with any of the persons mentioned. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-2(5) (1987). 
The operation of section 34 was explained by the drafters 
of the UCCJA, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws, as follows: 
Paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection 
(a)5 establish the two major bases for 
jurisdiction. In the first place, a court in 
the child's home state has jurisdiction, and 
secondly, if there is no home state or the 
child and his family have equal or stronger 
ties with another state, a court in that 
state has jurisdiction. If this alternative 
test produces concurrent jurisdiction in more 
than one state, the mechanisms provided in 
sections 66 and 77 are used to assure that 
only one state makes the custody decision. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1987). 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(a)(i), (ii) (1987) 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-6 (1987). 
7. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-7 (1987). 
Paragraph (2) comes into play either 
when the home state test cannot be met or as 
an alternative to that test. The first 
situation arises, for example, when a family 
has moved frequently and there is no state 
where the child has lived for 6 months prior 
to suit, or if the child has recently been 
removed from his home state and the person 
who was left behind has also moved away. See 
paragraph (1),9 last clause. A typical 
example of alternative jurisdiction is the 
case in which the stay-at-home parent chooses 
to follow the departed spouse to state 2 
(where the child has lived for several months 
with the other parent) and starts proceedings 
there. 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Comment at 20-21 (1968) 
(emphasis added) (hereinafter Comment). 
Thus, the plain language of section 310 and the comments 
thereto provide that State Two has jurisdiction if it meets one 
of the bases established in that section. 
B. Other Sections of the UCCJA 
Moreover, if Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1987) is construed 
otherwise, the remaining sections of the UCCJA fail to make sense 
wherein they require that State Two shall stay proceedings if the 
matter is pending in another state, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-6(3) 
(1987); or may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if the first 
state is a more appropriate forum, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-7 
(1987); or may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if the 
petitioner is guilty of improper conduct, Utah Code Ann. § 78-
45c-8(l) (1987); and shall not exercise rts jurisdiction to 
modify unless the interest of the child necessitates, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45c-8(2) (1987). All of the foregoing are indicia of 
jurisdiction: If a court does not have jurisdiction, it does not 
have the power to stay proceedings, nor the power to decline to 
exercise its jurisdiction, nor the power to proceed with the 
proceedings even if to do so would be in the best interest of the 
children's safety and well being. It would have no choice but to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
8. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(a)(ii) (1987). 
9. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(a)(i) (1987). 
10. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-3 (1987). 
However, a court does have these choices because the UCCJA 
specifically confers jurisdiction on the second state where the 
child and a parent have been living for at least six consecutive 
months (home state), Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1) (a) (1987); or 
when it is in the best interest of the child to assume 
jurisdiction because the child and at least one parent have a 
significant connection with the second state and there is 
substantive evidence in that state pertaining to the child's 
care, protection, training and personal relationships, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45c-3(1)(b) (1987); or in the case of an emergency, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-3(1)(c) (1987); or when no other state 
has jurisdiction or another state has declined to exercise 
jurisdiction, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(1) (d) (1987). 
C. Utah Cases 
The Utah Supreme Court's holding in Tuttle v. Henderson, 628 
P.2d 1275 (Utah 1981) offers additional insight into the issue of 
concurrent jurisdiction under the UCCJA. In that case, the trial 
court acknowledged that it had jurisdiction, but refused to 
exercise it under the circumstances of that case. IdL at 1276. 
Although Tuttle is a pre-UCCJA case, the court quoted extensively 
from the UCCJA and found that the UCCJA provided persuasive 
authority to support its affirmance of the trial court's holding 
that it had concurrent jurisdiction. id. at 1276-77. 
Also instructive is the Utah Supreme Court's holding in 
Coppedge v/Harding, 714 P.2d 1121 (Utah 1985), a post-UCCJA 
case. In that case, an action was filed by the Coppedges in 
Oregon, to make them guardians of their grandson, who was living 
with them in Oregon. In response, a custody action by the 
child's parents was subsequently filed in Utah. The Utah Supreme 
Court ordered the district court "to stay the Utah action to the 
extent that it seeks to determine custody under the Uniform Act" 
and "to communicate with the Oregon Court . . . to determine the 
propriety of further proceedings in Oregon." Id. at 1122. The 
district court was further instructed that "[i]n the event that 
the Oregon court stays its proceedings after such communication, 
then the Utah court may proceed to adjudicate the custody 
matter." Id. If Utah did not have jurisdiction, then the 
district court could not have been ordered to stay its 
proceedings nor to proceed after communicating with Oregon. On 
the other hand, if Oregon did not have jurisdiction, then the 
Utah Supreme Court would have simply concluded such and ordered 
the district court to proceed. The only conclusion that can be 
drawn from this case is the existence of concurrent jurisdiction. 
See also State in Interest of W.D. v. Drake, 770 P.2d 1011, 1013 
(Utah App. 1989) (under the facts of that case, Utah and 
California had concurrent jurisdiction); Rawlings v. Weiner, 752 
P.2d 1327, 1331 (Utah App.) (Bench, J., concurring) (under the 
facts of that case, Utah had primary jurisdiction and Washington 
had secondary jurisdiction), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 
1988) . 
III. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION 
Once the jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJA have been 
met, our inquiry then turns to the exercise of that jurisdiction. 
Just because a state has jurisdiction does not mean that it can 
exercise it as to custody. State Two "shall not exercise its 
jurisdiction under this act if at the time of filing the petition 
a proceeding concerning custody of the child was pending in a 
court of another state exercising jurisdiction . . . . If Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45c-6(l) (1987). In such case, State Two ,fshall 
stay the proceeding and communicate with the court in which the 
other proceeding is pending to the end that the issue may be 
litigated in the more appropriate forum . . . .ff Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45c-6(3) (1987). Secondly, a court may decline to exercise 
its jurisdiction if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-7(l) (1987). Thirdly, where State Two 
has jurisdiction, it generally cannot modify the custody decree 
of State One unless it appears to the court of State Two that 
State One "does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional 
requirements substantially in accordance with [the UCCJA] or has 
declined to assume jurisdiction[.]ff Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-
14(1) (a) (1987).11 Thus, even if jurisdiction is established 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1987), Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45c-
6, -7, and -14 (1987) govern the exercise of that jurisdiction. 
However, if both parents and the children move from the 
state of the original decree, deference to that state's 
jurisdiction is no longer required. State in Interest of D.S.K., 
792 P.2d 118, 124 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Bodenheimer, 
Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing 
Jurisdiction under the UCCJA, 14 Fam. L.Q. 203, 214-15 (1981)). 
As the drafters' comment to section 1412 states: 
11. State Two may nonetheless proceed with matters other than 
custody. As stated in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-7(6) (1987), 
ft[t]he court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this 
act if a custody determination is incidental to an action for 
divorce on another proceeding while retaining jurisdiction over 
the divorce or other proceedings.11 
12. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-14 (1987). 
Courts which render a custody decree 
normally retain continuing jurisdiction to 
modify the decree under local law. Courts in 
other states have in the past often assumed 
jurisdiction to modify the out-of-state 
decree themselves without regard to the 
preexisting jurisdiction of the other state. 
See People ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 
610, 67 S.Ct. 903 (1947). In order to 
achieve greater stability of custody 
arrangements and avoid forum shopping, 
subsection (a) declares that other states 
will defer to the continuing jurisdiction of 
the court of another state as long as that 
state has jurisdiction under the standards of 
the Act. In other words, all petitions for 
modification are to be addressed to the prior 
state if that state has sufficient contact 
with the case to satisfy section 3.13 The 
fact that the court had previously considered 
the case may be one factor favoring its 
continued jurisdiction. If, however, all the 
persons involved have moved away or the 
contact with the state has otherwise become 
slight, modification jurisdiction would shift 
elsewhere. Compare Ratner, Child Custody in 
a Federal System, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 795, 821-
22 (1964). 
For example, if custody was awarded to 
the father in state 1 where he continued to 
live with the children for two years and 
thereafter his wife kept the children in 
state 2 for 6-1/2 months (3-1/2 months beyond 
her visitation privileges) with or without 
permission of the husband, state 1 has 
preferred jurisdiction to modify the decree 
despite the fact that state 2 has in the 
meantime become the "home state" of the 
child. If, however, the father also moved 
away from state 1, that state loses 
modification jurisdiction interstate, whether 
or not its jurisdiction continues under local 
law. See Clark, Domestic Relations 322-23 
(1968) . 
Comment at 32. 
13. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1987). 
Additionally, if the stay-at-home parent fails to assert his 
or her custody rights, then State One's jurisdiction ceases: 
[I]f the father in the same case continued to 
live in state 1, but let his wife keep the 
children for several years without asserting 
his custody rights and without visits of 
the children in state 1, modification 
jurisdiction of state 1 would cease. Compare 
Brenqle v. Hurst, 408 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1966). 
Id. 
IV. APPLICATION TO THE CASE AT BAR 
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, there is no 
question but that the Utah District Court has jurisdiction under 
the plain language of the UCCJA. Utah is the home state of the 
children because they have lived here with their mother for over 
two years, substantially longer than the six months required by 
the UCCJA. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(a) (1987). 
Furthermore, the children and Mrs. Crump have significant 
connection with Utah and substantial evidence exists in Utah 
concerning their training, care, protection and personal 
relationships. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45c-l(1)(c), -3(b) 
(1987). "Where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, 
[appellate courts] will not look beyond to divine legislative 
intent. Instead, we are guided by the rule that a statute should 
be construed according to its plain language.'1 Allisen v. 
American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988) 
(citation omitted). Thus, we should hold that according to the 
plain language of section 78-45c-3, the Utah district court and 
this court have jurisdiction to hear this case. 
Furthermore, although Mr. Crump has continued to live in 
Montana, he came to Utah, docketed the Montana judgment in Utah, 
petitioned the Utah Court to modify the Montana decree, and then 
appealed that judgment to this court. The Utah District Court 
had before it the children and mother who had lived in Utah for 
over two years, and the father who petitioned the Utah court 
seeking to modify the Montana custody decree. Such a scenario 
was the subject of the drafters' comment to section 3,K wherein 
it stated: ffA typical example of alternative jurisdiction is the 
case in which the stay-at-home parent chooses to follow the 
departed spouse to state 2 (where the child has lived for several 
months with the other parent) and starts proceedings there." 
14. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1987). 
Comment at 21. That is exactly what we have in this case: Mr. 
Crump (stay-at-home parent) chose to follow Mrs. Crump (departed 
spouse) to Utah (where the children have lived for over two years 
with their mother) and commence proceedings in Utah. This offers 
further support for concluding that the district court had 
jurisdiction to hear this case. 
Having found that the jurisdictional requirements of the 
UCCJA have been met, our inquiry turns to whether or not the Utah 
court could exercise its jurisdiction. As noted above, if Mr. 
Crump had, of his own volition, moved from Montana, Utah would 
then be able to exercise its jurisdiction. Also, if Mr. Crump, 
of his own volition, had never asserted his custody rights in 
Montana, Utah would then be able to exercise its jurisdiction. 
The question which remains for us is whether Utah should be able 
to exercise its jurisdiction when Mr. Crump, of his own volition, 
chooses to follow Mrs. Crump to Utah and bring suit here. 
This very question was answered i^  Williams v. Williams, 555 
N.E.2d 142 (Ind. 1990).15 In that case, the father lived in 
Indiana with one child and the mother lived in Illinois with the 
other child. She filed a petition in Indiana for custody of both 
children. The Indiana court awarded custody of both children to 
the father. The mother appealed, and the Indiana Court of 
Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that because Illinois 
was the home state of the one child, Indiana lacked jurisdiction 
under the UCCJA to deal with custody. 
The Supreme Court of Indiana reversed the court of appeals, 
stating: 
Once a court possesses subject matter 
jurisdiction to consider the general class or 
kind of case, its specific jurisdiction over 
a particular case within the general class is 
subject to waiver. In fState ex rel. Hight 
v. Marion Superior Court, 547 N.E.2d 267, 270 
(Ind. 1989)] we observed: 
Ind. Code § 31-1-11.5-3(a) 
and (b) empower a trial court to 
hear causes of action for 
dissolution and for child support. 
15. Although Williams concerns an initial custody determination, 
rather than modification of custody, it is nonetheless persuasive 
because the UCCJA establishes the same jurisdictional standards 
for child custody determinations by initial or modification 
decree. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(l) (1987). 
Within this grant of subject matter 
jurisdiction is the power to 
determine child support. (Ind. 
Code § 31-1-11.5-12), child custody 
(Ind. Code § 31-1-11.5-20), and 
visitation (Ind. Code § 31-1-11.5-
24). By filing the dissolution 
action, [the wife] engaged the 
trial court's subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear dissolution 
cases, which includes the authority 
to decide issues of child support 
and visitation. 
Resolution of the subject matter 
jurisdiction issue involves determining 
whether the claim advanced falls within the 
general scope of authority conferred upon the 
court by the constitution or statute. The 
authority to hear child custody cases is not 
directly granted by the UCCJA. Rather, Sec. 
3(a) merely operates to restrict the existing 
power of courts to hear custody cases. Ind. 
Code § 31-1-11.6-3(a) begins: 
A court of this state which is 
competent to decide child custody 
matters has jurisdiction to make 
child custody determination by 
initial remodification decree if: 
[emphasis added] 
The source of this competency to decide child 
custody matters is found in Ind. Code § 31-1-
11.5-20 and is an incidental grant of 
specific authority within the general grant 
of subject matter jurisdiction to hear 
actions for dissolution and child support. 
The jurisdictional limitations imposed by the 
UCCJA are not equivalent to declarations of 
subject matter jurisdiction, but rather are 
refinements of the ancillary capacity of a 
trial court to exercise authority over a 
particular case. This exercise of authority 
is waivable. 
Because of the voluntary conduct of 
Bonnie in affirmatively engaging the Indiana 
courts to determine custody, and expressly 
consenting to the trial court's authority to 
determine custody, we find that she has 
waived any guestion regarding the authority 
of the court to decide the issue of custody 
under the facts of her case and has thus 
waived the trial court's jurisdiction over 
her particular case. 
Id. at 144-45 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
Also persuasive is the Indiana Court of Appeals' holding in 
Schneider v. Schneider, 555 N.E.2d 196 (Ind. App. 1990). In 
circumstances similar to those in the case at bar, the court held 
that under the UCCJA, Indiana had jurisdiction to modify a 
Wisconsin custody decree because the stay-at-home parent 
"voluntarily submitted himself to the trial court's 
jurisdiction,11 Id. at 199, thereby raising an inference that the 
parties considered Indiana to be the more appropriate forum. Id. 
In the present case, this court raised sua sponte an 
objection to jurisdiction, and now bases its decision on a lack 
thereof. Instead, we should infer from Mr. Crump's decision to 
come to Utah, docket the Montana judgment here, petition the Utah 
Court to modify the Montana decree, and then appeal that judgment 
to this court, that the parties before us consider Utah the more 
appropriate forum in which to litigate this action. See also In 
re Marriage of Slate, 536 N.E.2d 894 (111. App. 1989) ("Under the 
UCCJA, jurisdiction refers not to the due process limitations of 
potential subject matter or personal jurisdiction, but instead to 
the legislature's discretionary limitation upon the exercise of 
existing jurisdiction. Thus the Act permits some discretion in 
the trial court's determination of its jurisdiction to ensure 
that jurisdiction takes place in the forum where the ties between 
the State and the child and his family are the closest." Id. at 
896 (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); In Re Marriage of 
Weinstein, 408 N.E.2d 952 (111. App. 1980) ("[WJhere both 
prospective custodians are present in a state and there is an 
opportunity for a full hearing on the custody issue, the 
jurisdictional requirements of the Uniform Act may be satisfied." 
Id. at 956 (citing Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1207, 1229 (1969)). 
In our case, the district court was competent to decide 
child custody matters under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (Supp. 
1991) ("The district court has original jurisdiction in all 
matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution 
and not prohibited by law."); Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1(1) (1989) 
("Proceedings in divorce are commenced and conducted as provided 
by law for proceedings in civil causes, except as provided by 
this chapter.11); and Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1(5)(d) (1989) ("In 
all actions the court and the judge have jurisdiction over . . . 
the custody and maintenance of minor children[.]"). See also 
Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5. Moreover, Utah has jurisdiction to 
make child custody determinations under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 
(1987). Since Mr. Crump voluntarily and affirmatively engaged 
the Utah courts to modify the Montana decree, in doing so he 
waived any question regarding authority of the Utah courts to 
decide the issue under the facts of this case and has thus waived 
any objection to the district court's authority to exercise its 
jurisdiction over this particular case. 
Furthermore, the majority opinion misconstrues the plain 
language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l) (1987) in reaching its 
erroneous conclusion that the said section strips Utah courts of 
jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l) (1987) provides: 
If a court of another state has made a 
custody decree, a court of this state shall 
not modify that decree unless (a) it appears 
to the court of this state that the court 
which rendered the decree does not now 
have jurisdiction under jurisdictional 
prerequisites substantially in accordance 
with this act or has declined to assume 
jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the 
court of this state has jurisdiction. 
The plain language of this section recognizes that both states 
can have concurrent jurisdiction: Montana has jurisdiction 
because it made the custody decree, and unless Utah also has 
jurisdiction under another section of the act, subsection (b) 
above is meaningless. Thus, it is clear that this section does 
not contain qualifying language that strips Utah courts of 
jurisdiction, but instead addresses the exercise of that 
jurisdiction.16 
Although the majority opinion correctly states that 
acquiescence of the parties is insufficient to confer 
jurisdiction on the court, such is inapplicable here. The 
parties are not purporting to confer jurisdiction upon the Utah 
16. Additionally, it should be noted that the Utah district 
court did not modify the Montana decree as to custody. While the 
Utah court had jurisdiction to modify the Montana custody decree, 
it chose not to because there had not been a substantial change 
of circumstances. 
courts. As shown above, Utah already had jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45C-3 (1987), By coming to Utah, docketing the 
Montana judgment here, petitioning the Utah District Court to 
modify the Montana custody decree, and appealing that judgment to 
this court, Mr. Crump did not purport to waive Montana's 
jurisdiction, but simply waived any objection to Utah's authority 
to exercise its jurisdiction. 
V. JURISDICTION UNDER THE 
PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT 
Nor is Utah's jurisdiction prohibited under the Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1991). In fact, 
both the plain language of the statute and its spirit and 
purposes support the conclusion that Utah has jurisdiction. 
Subsection (f) of 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1991) contains language 
similar to that found in Utah Code Ann. 78-45c-14(1) (1987).17 
Subsection (f) provides: 
A court of a State may modify a 
determination of the custody of the same 
child made by a court of another State, if --
(1) it has jurisdiction to 
make such a child custody 
determi nation; and 
(2) the court of the other 
state no longer has jurisdiction, 
or it has declined to exercise such 
jurisdiction to modily such 
determination. 
As is the case with section 78-45c-14, this section does not 
strip Utah courts of jurisdiction, but merely addresses the 
exercise of that jurisdiction. The majority opinion acknowledges 
as much wherein it states that the jurisdictional prerequisites 
17. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l) (1987) provides: 
If a court of another state has made a 
custody decree, a court of this state shall 
not modify that decree unless (a) it appears 
to the court of this state that the court 
which rendered the decree does not now 
have jurisdiction under jurisdictional 
prerequisites substantially in accordance 
with this act or has declined to assume 
jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the 
court of this state has jurisdiction. 
of subsection (1) have been met. Nonetheless, the majority 
opinion then seems to contradict itself by reaching the 
conclusion that despite the fact that subsection (1) has been 
met, the Utah courts do not have jurisdiction. 
Secondly, an examination of the purposes of the act support 
Utah assuming jurisdiction under the circumstances of this case. 
Those purposes include: (1) deterring interstate abductions, 
(2) determination of custody by the state which can best decide 
the case in the interest of the child, (3) facilitating the 
enforcement of custody decrees of sister states, and (4) 
promotion of greater stability of home environment. See 
generally Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No, 
96-611, § 7, 94 Stat. 3569 (1980). First, the case at bar does 
not concern a parent that has abducted a child and moved 
elsewhere to find a more favorable forum. Instead, we have a 
very different scenario in which the stay-at-home parent has 
affirmatively chosen to follow the departed spouse to the home 
state of the children and bring suit there. Secondly, as 
discussed above, since Mrs. Crump and the children have lived in 
Utah for over two years, Utah is in the best position to decide 
the case in the interest of the children. Thirdly, since the 
Utah District Court did not modify the custody portion of the 
Montana decree, its decision does facilitate enforcement of that 
decree. Lastly, rather than promoting greater stability of home 
environment, the majority opinion instead promotes the excessive 
litigation that the act was created to curb. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
I would hold that the trial court had jurisdiction, as 
well as the right to exercise its jurisdiction in this matter. 
Accordingly, I would hold that this court has jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal, and that the matter should proceed on appeal.18 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
18. While the result in this case in no way compels either party 
to petition for certiorari in Utah, or modification in Montana, 
resolution of this controversy may require such. This 
possibility is particularly disturbing in light of the fact that 
the children have already appeared twice before judges in two 
states. 
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AFTERNOON SESSION, THURSDAY, JUNE 6, 1985. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings were convened 
in Chambers with only the Judge and children present, 
and the following proceedings were had:) 
THE COURT: What's your name? 
RONNIE: Ronnie. 
THE COURT: Can. I put my name on 
there? Okay. How about that. I'li just put my name 
right on there so you know who I am, and I'll put 
something like that kind of a symbol. In our family 
we use a symbol like that, and that's a -- that means 
12 that one of our children has been there. That's 
supposed to be a cat. How'd you do that? 
RONNIE: I went fishing. I put my 
pole down' and I was going up to talk to Jamie and I 
was coming up and I -- coming up and it was sort of 
steep and I slipped and hit a rock, rolled down hit 
another rock, and I -- and another rock came and hit 
my leg. 
THE COURT: Does it hurt? Does it 
hurt today? 
RONNIE: A little bit 
THE COURT: You know what? I broke 
both of my legs at one time or another in my life, 
and they hurt, don't they? Okay. Now we have to do 
TAT BY MARSHALL AND MARSHALL 
1 this, we have to get all your names. 
2 BRET : I 'm Bret . 
3 THE COURT: Now you're Bret. Can you 
4 sign your own name? I'll bet I can guess your name. 
5 BRET: Scotty. 
6 THE COURT: Oh, you went and told me. 
7 And your Rob, and Ronnie. And Ronnie we know we 
8 talked to already because Ronnie's got a bum leg 
9 today. 
10 BRET: No, a broken one. 
11 I THE COURT: Well, it will be all 
12 right. It will get all healed up, won't it? Now you 
13 I fellows know where you're at? This lady's taking 
14 down what we say so -- I guess we didn't show you 
15 [that. You guys have got to come over and take a look 
16 at that. That machine works when somebody says 
17 something. When you said, "I'm Bret" -- we'll all be 
18 quiet for a minute and then you say "I'm Bret." 
19 BRET: I'm Bret. 
20 THE COURT: Rob, how long you been in 
21 Montana this time? 
22 ROBBIE: About a week. 
23 THE COURT: About a week. And are you 
24 all done with school this year? 
25 ROBBIE: We got done this Friday. 
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THE COURT: Last Friday. What do you 
have there, some jawbreakers or some bubble gum? 
ROBBIE: Bubble gum. 
THE COURT: Where did you get the 
bubble gum? 
ROBBIE: Downstairs. 
THE COURT: How about you Ronnie, you 
got some bubble gum, too? 
RONNIE: Yes. 
THE COURT: And Bret and Scotty got 
rid of theirs already. 
BRET: No, I didn't get any. 
THE COURT: Oh, you poor guy. How do 
you like living down in Utah? 
ROBBIE: Terrible. 
BRET: I do too. I feel really 
terrible . 
ROBBIE: It's not very fun, but we're 
gonna move up here. I hate it down in Utah. 
THE COURT: You'd move up here 
anyway? Who told you that? 
ROBBIE: Mom. 
that happen? 
THE COURT: She did, huh. When did 
ROBBIE: A while ago. 
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THE COURT: How about Scotty, where 
does Scotty like to live at? 
SCOTTY: Me? I like to live up here 
in Montana best. 
THE COURT: You like to live in 
Montana. Are you a cowboy? 
SCOTTY: Yes. 
THE COURT: You ride a horse? 
SCOTTY: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Now, Bret, what kind of 
shoes do you call those? 
BRET: Shiney ones. 
THE COURT: You like shiney shoes. 
Why do you like to live in Montana better 'than you d 
in Utah, Bret? 
BRET: Because I don't feel very 
better in Utah 
THE COURT: You get along, Bret, well 
with your mommy? 
BRET: I feel terrible with her. I 
feel terrible with her. 
THE COURT: And how do you get along 
with your mommy, Rob? Do you get along with her? 
ROBBIE : Oh, yes . 
THE COURT: Do you get along well wit 
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your daddy? 
ROBBIE: Sort of. 
THE COURT: What do you mean by that? 
ROBBIE: I don't see him very much. 
THE COURT: Well/ do you get along 
with him when you see him? 
ROBBIE: Yes 
you? 
THE COURT: Is he ever mean to you? 
ROBBIE: No, 
THE COURT: Your mommy ever mean to 
ROBBIE: No. 
THE COURT: How about you Robbie, you 
get along well with your daddy? 
BRET: His name's Ronnie. 
your mother? 
farm? 
THE COURT: Do you get along well with 
RONNIE : Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: How about your daddy? 
RONNIE: I get along with him, too. 
THE COURT: You like your daddy's 
RONNIE : Yeah. 
THE COURT: Have you got a cow out 
there of your own? What's her name? 
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this year. 
RONNIE: Twinky. 
THE COURT: How'd you do in school 
RONNIE: Good. 
THE COURT: You passed? 
RONNIE: I made third. 
ROBBIE: I made fourth, but I didn't 
like school at all. 
school, Rob? 
school? 
THE COURT: Why didn't you like 
ROBBIE: Because it's too hard. 
THE COURT: What do you have to do in 
ROBBIE: A lot of stuff that's too 
hard. Like I gotta get three assignments done in a 
half hour. 
THE COURT: Oh, well, how big are the 
ass ignments ? 
ROBBIE: Paper about that size. About 
like this big sheet of paper. 
THE COURT: You don't go to school, do 
you? 
SCOTTY: I do too. 
THE COURT: Do you go to kindergarden 
SCOTTY: Uh-huh, kindergarden. 
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THE COURT: What do you do in 
kindergarden? 
SCOTTY: We play around. 
THE COURT: Bret, you're kind of an 
active guy, aren't you? Well now, I'll tell you 
what, you guys can go now. 
BRET: You didn't talk to me. 
THE COURT: Well, Bret and Scotty, 
will you leave for a minute. You go back out in the 
hall. Is there somebody to talk to out there? And 
Ronnie and Robbie stay here. Okay. See you guys. 
(Whereupon, there was a brief pause in the 
proceedings while Bret and Scotty left the room.) 
THE COURT: Now, have you talked to 
your daddy about your -- where you're gonna live next 
year . 
i 
ROBBIE: No. 
THE COURT: Have you talked to your 
mommy about it? 
ROBBIE: (child nodded). 
21 I THE COURT: What did your mommy say 
22 about it? 
23 ROBBIE: She don't know. 
24 THE COURT: She doesn't know what you 
25 [are going to do. 
CAT BY MARSHALL AND MARSHALL 
1 ROBBIE: Just as long as we get out of 
2 the place we're at. 
3 THE COURT: You mean she doesn't like 
4 to live where your living either? 
5 ROBBIE: No, because we're living in 
6 one part of a house and it's just -- it's a normal 
7 house, but it's got two places in it — two stories. 
8 And the walls are like paper. You talk and it goes 
9 right through the wall. You can hear the neighbors 
10 talk whenever you want to. 
11 J THE COURT: So that's why you want to 
12 imove back to Montana? 
13 ROBBIE: (child nodded). 
14 I THE COURT: And your mommy said she's 
15 Igoing to move back to Montana? 
16 ROBBIE: Yeah, if we get a trailer. 
17 THE COURT: Oh, you're going to get a 
18 trailer. Where would you put that? 
19 ROBBIE: Out back of Grandpa's 
20 garden . 
21 THE COURT: Which grandpa is that? 
22 ROBBIE: Holyoak. 
23 THE COURT: Do you have a lot of 
24 friends around St. Ignatius? 
25 ROBBIE: Uh-huh. 
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THE COURT: Some of your schoolmates? 
ROBBIE: Well, I can't remember any 
schoolmates, because I haven't went to school up here 
for two years. 
THE COURT: I see. How about you, 
Ronnie, can you remember some of your friends from 
here? 
RONNIE: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: What's some of their 
names ? 
RONNIE: Sam, he's my best friend. 
THE COURT: Now, tell me how long did 
the doctor tell you you're gonna have to have your 
leg in that cast? 
ROBBIE: Four weeks. 
RONNIE: I have to have this one on 
for two weeks, and then I get a walking cast. 
THE COURT: Oh, do you? Oh, that's 
good. Have you got a pair of crutches yet? 
RONNIE: Yeah, my grandpa got me a 
pai r . 
THE COURT: Can you walk on them? 
RONNIE: Tomorrow I can. 
THE COURT: Which grandpa got you the 
crutches ? 
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ROBBIE: Holyoak. 
THE COURT: How do you get along with 
your other grandparents? 
RONNIE: Pretty good. 
THE COURT: You like to help your dad 
out on the farm? 
RONNIE: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Does he make you work 
pretty hard? 
RONNIE: No. 
THE COURT: Do you like to work/ Rob? 
ROBBIE: Yes. 
THE COURT: What do you do out there 
on the farm with your dad? 
ROBBIE: Mess around with cows. 
THE COURT: Would you like to spend 
the summer at the farm --
ROBBIE: Yes. 
THE COURT: -- or would you rather 
spend it in Utah? 
ROBBIE: Here. 
THE COURT: You'd rather be here? 
ROBBIE: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: If both your mommy and 
daddy were here, you'd like that better? 
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ROBBIE: Yes. 
THE COURT: How about you, Ronnie? 
RONNIE: I don't know. 
THE COURT: Would you like to spend 
the summer in St. Ignatius or in Utah? 
RONNIE: I'd like to spend it in Saint 
Ignatius. 
THE COURT: Is your leg hurting? 
RONNIE: I'm just trying to lift it. 
It's heavy. 
THE COURT: You just come up a little 
while ago, just a few minutes ago? 
RONNIE: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Will you tell me, as far 
as your grandparents are concerned, which one of your 
grandparents do you gee along with the best? 
ROBBIE: Holyoak. 
THE COURT: Why do you say that? 
ROBBIE: Because I don'z see Grandpa 
Crump that long -- enough. 
THE COURT: You haven't seen Grandpa 
Crump for a long time. Would you like to see him? 
ROBBIE: No. 
THE COURT: Why not? 
ROBBIE: I'm having fun over at 
•» Y> #*• TY * r r x >TT-N x i K r > O t l A T T 
Jamie f s house. 
THE COURT: At Jamie's house? 
ROBBIE: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Well, do you have fun when 
you go over to your daddy's house? 
ROBBIE: Yes• 
THE COURT: That's where you grew up, 
wasn't it ? 
ROBBIE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you have your own room 
there? 
ROBBIE: Yes. I have to share it with 
that (child indicating) when we're over there 
though. 
THE COURT: You two share a room. 
That's a lot better than getting Scotty and Bret in 
there , isn ' t it ? 
ROBBIE: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: I bet they're little — 
wild little apes, aren't they? 
ROBBIE: I bet you couldn't even go to 
bed with them over there jumping around. All of a 
sudden you fall asleep and get up. I always have to 
stay awake until they go to sleep, then I go to 
sleep, then I have to get up. 
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THE COURT: Bret's the noisy one? 
ROBBIE: Scotty's the noisy one, too. 
Scotty goes to sleep real fast. He goes to sleep in 
Mom's room. 
THE COURT: I bet Ronnie's really 
quiet, isn't he? 
ROBBIE: No. 
truth 
THE COURT: Are you quiet? Tell the 
ROBBIE: No. 
THE COURT: You boys go to church? 
ROBBIE: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Who do you go to to church 
with? 
ROBBIE: Lots of people. 
THE COURT: Lots of people. Can you 
name some of them? 
ROBBIE: Dad and Mom. 
chu rch? 
him? 
THE COURT: Daddy takes you to 
ROBBIE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you like to go with 
ROBBIE: Yes. 
THE COURT: You like to go with your 
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mother? 
ROBBIE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Anything you want to tell 
me that we haven't talked about, Ronnie? 
RONNIE: No. 
THE COURT: This kind of makes you 
boys confused, does it? 
ROBBIE: Yes. 
THE COURT: I bet it does. Well, 
we'll try to do something and we'll see what we can 
do. And you'll be -- probably be here for awhile at 
least. Is that okay with you? 
ROBBIE: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Good. Then you're going 
to move b.ack up to Montana from Utah anyway, you 
said? 
ROBBIE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, thank you for 
being here. Now I can't lift Ronnie, and so I'll 
have -- who was out there that brought you in? 
ROBBIE: Grandpa. I can take him. 
THE COURT: He's a little too big. 
ROBBIE: No he's not. He is a year 
and a half younger than me. 
THE COURT: We can't let you drop 
CAT BY MARSHALL AND MARSHALL 
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him. We wouldn't want to do that. You don't know 
how badly a leg hurts when it's broken, does he? 
RONNIE: I got my big bone broken. My 
little bone's not broken. 
ROBBIE: You should have seen Jamie's 
arm. He fell off the horse when he was breaking it. 
RONNIE: He got bucked off. 
ROBBIE: His bones, both of them, were 
broken off like that. Two bones were sticking out of 
his arm. 
THE COURT: Oh boy, that's terrible. 
Well, that's all boys. Will you tell him, please, 
Rob? 
(Whereupon, this portion of the proceeding 
was concluded on this 6th day of June, 1985.) 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
I, Tamara A. Boys, Professional 
Shorthand Reporter, do hereby certify that I was 
present at and reported in shorthand the proceeding 
in the foregoing matter, that I thereafter reduced 
shorthand notes to typewritten form, comprising 
the foregoing transcript; further, the foregoing 
transcript is a full and accurate record of the 
proceedings, as requested, in this matter on the da 
set forth. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I-have hereunto 
set my hand on this 19th day of June, 1985. 
:k •T7W <T* C\ • hC'-^fl; 
Tamara A. Boys ^ 
Professional Shorthand Reporter 
Residing in Poison, Montana 
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